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Abstract
OPTIMIZATION OF CRIME CONTROL RESOURCES IN A SOCIETY
By
Steven Thompson Masters of Science
Utah State University
2011
Major Professor: Shannon Peterson
Department Economcis
This paper looks at the economics of crime control through the Phillips-Votey
Societal Cost Function model and mathematically proves that there is a socially
optimal point at which society should be devoting resources towards the prevention
of crime. This allows the society to minimize the social cost of crime given a
theoretical cost constraint. This paper take the model further by conducting
comparative analysis to determine the effect that changes in the functional form of
crime generation, and crime prevention will have on society as represented in the
model. This paper also looks at the counter intuitive effect that growth in per capita
GDP has a negative effect on crime rates, as a follow up to recently published article
in The Economist magazine. We will expand this to see if this pattern continues for
other countries with high rates of poverty. It also explores the social economical
causes of crime generation by looking at Steven Ralphael’s paper The Effect of
Unemployment on Crime and Richard Rosenfeld and Steven Messner paper The
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Social Sources of Homicide in Different Types of Societies adding a multinational
dimension to Ralphael’s paper. This paper expands the Messner and Ralphael
model by not only reproducing the OLS regression but by also using a fractional
logit regression to create a more robust model. This paper uses the fractional logit
regression in order to get a better idea how social economic factors such as
unemployment rates and monetary inequality may influence crime.
This paper then looks at the largest portion of a state’s expenditure of crime
control, the use of prisons to see how effective they are in reforming prisoners and
acting as a deterrent for future criminal behavior of this former prison population.

5

Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude to my chair. Thank you for your help with this
project along with other professors who gave me guidance namely Professors Tyler
Brough and Charles Sims
Steven Thompson

6

List of Tables
Table 1 Comparison of Crime Control Resource Expenditure to Loss Due To Crime
Table 2 Fractional logit regression of total crime on change in GDP in U.S.A.
Table 3 Fractional Logit Regression of burglary on change in GDP in U.S.A.
Table 4 Fractional Logit Regression of Murder on change in GDP in U.S.A.
Table 5 Fractional Logit Regression of crime on change in GDP in India
Table 6 Fractional Logit Regression of burglary on change in GDP in India
Table 7 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on change in GDP in India
Table 8 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on Gini Index Worldwide
Table 9 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on Gini Index and legal risk
worldwide
Table 10 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on unemployment, inequality, and
legal risk worldwide
Table 11 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on unemployment, inequality, and
legal risk worldwide
Table 12 Estimates of Social Loss Rates for 61 Offenses (in 1979 dollars): Derived by
Phillips and Votey
Table 13 Results from Logit Regression 1978 Cohort
Table 14 Results from Logit Regression 1980s Cohort
Table 15 Marginal Effects from Logit Regression
Table 16 Estimates of Social Loss Rates for 61 Offenses (in 1979 dollars): Derived by
Phillips and Votey

7

List of Figures
Figure 1 The total cost of Society by crime between the years 1993-2006
Figure 2 Adaption of Phillips-Votey Figure 2.1 illustration A Schematic Illustration of
Crime Generation and Crime Cost
Figure 3 Average number of murders per 100,000
Figure 4 Murder gini coefficient chart.

8

Existing Literature
The purpose of this paper is three fold, first to prove mathematically that
there exists an optimal point for a society in which they should devote their
resources to minimize the social cost of crime. The basis for the theoretical model
comes from Llad Phillips and Harold Votey Jr. book The Economics of Crime Control
(1981). Where Phillips and Votey create a model to explain crime control resources
in a society, this paper will expand this model to allow for comparative analysis of
Phillips Votey model. The Phillips Votey model was selected because it had the
theoretical microeconomic construct that was conducive to allow us to look at both
the cost created by the crime and crime resources. It is well accepted and
frequently used in current literature and it allows the reader to achieve a greater
microeconomic understanding of the entire effect of crime on society. Most other
models look at the effect of the cost of the crime and not the cost and resources
associated with crime control, the Philips Votey Model looks at both.
After showing the theoretical minimal point this paper will look at current
crime control resource expenditures in the United States to see how those
expenditures compare to the theoretical minimization point proven by this paper.
The Second point of this paper is to find the Social Economical causes of
crime generation. Although the Phillips Votey model recognizes that social
economical causes as an important source of crime generation, they do not explore
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the social economic forces that drive crime generation, so this paper will use data
from Liska, Chamlin and Reed’s Article Testing the Economic Production and Conflict
Models of Crime Control which looks at social inequality determined by both income
inequality and racism as possible influences on crime. This paper will focus mainly
on social inequality as well as with per capita GDP to see if that may be one of the
reasons for the crime generation process. This paper will start by comparing the
per capita GDP of two similar political structures (Republics, made up of three
branches of government legislative, judicial and executive with the largest portion of
power coming from the legislative branch and a law structure based on English
common law) that have large portions of data available to the public to see how
changes in per capita GDP may affect crime rates. The two countries we are
comparing are India and the United States. This will show that as per capita GDP
increases that both of these countries see an increase in specific types of crime, and
that certain types of crime decrease in the United States with decreased change in
per capita GDP, where in India those same crimes increase, we will explore why in
this paper.
The third point of this paper is to explore utility model for a recently released
prisoner in order to show how a society can allocate resources most efficiently
towards decreasing the probability of recidivism. There have been a number of
studies which indicate the effectiveness of prisons and causes of recidivism. Michael
Jacobson in his book Downsizing Prisons: how to reduce crime and End Mass
Incarceration (2005) argues that increased prison sentences do not reduce crime.
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Joan Petersilia in her book When Prisoners come Home argues that there exists a
number of aspects that effect prison reentry into society, housing, age at the time of
the prisoner’s release from prison, racism, inmate participation in prison programs,
biases against prisoners to achieve employment, prior incarceration, use of the
parole system, and drug treatment in prison. Lipton, Martinson and Wilks in their
book The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment
Evaluation Studies conducted a meta-analysis which showed the effectiveness of
supervision during the probation period, increased skill development, individual
counseling, group counseling and Milieu therapy. This paper expanded these
studies by creating a microeconomic model which shows how a released prisoner
would optimize their utility given an economic constraint and how such
optimization could result on recidivism depending on the utility and cost structure
of our prisoner.
Introduction
In 2006 crime cost the average American at least $344 either directly as a
result of being a victim of crime or indirectly in taxes paid for crime prevention. One
of the largest and seemingly most ineffective tools towards crime prevention in the
United States is the prisoner reform system. In 1978, the United States spent $5
Billion to operate the nation’s prisons; this figured has increase in nominal terms by
more than 1300% to $72 billion in 2007. Increased spending on correctional
facilities has caused a significant strain on the states, which on average spend 7% of
their state budget on correctional facilities. As the demographics of the inmates are
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changing, because of increased life spans and a growing part of the prison
population with an age of 40+ years, this figure is predicted to increase significantly.
The reason for this impending increase is because prisoners over 41 years of age on
average cost the state $66,000 a year, compared to $22,000 for adults under 40,
much of this cost is because of higher cost of medical cost. If the present nationwide
rate of growth continues, it will be necessary to build the equivalent of two new
prisons every week just to keep pace. Prior incarceration has been a poor deterrent
for future violation of crime. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics a person
with a criminal history will be about 882% percent more likely to go back to prison
than a person that was never previously incarcerated. (Statistics, 2007) (Jacobson,
2005) (Schmidt and Witte, 1988) (Bonczar & Beck, 1997)
Many crimes have a portion of the crime that has a measurable economic loss
to the victim and to society. If a criminal burglarizes a victim, the victim has a fixed
monitary loss as a result of the burglary, but there is also a non-monitary cost to the
crime felt by the victim. The victim may feel less safe, increased fear, anger, or some
other unwanted emotion as a result of the crime. The criminal would have some
utilitary gain from preforming the action, in the example above the criminal would
receive an economic gain as a result of the burglary. This gain will likely come at
some cost to the criminal, for example the time spent looking for people to
burglarise could have be spent doing some other action to gain utility.
This paper would like to acknowlege the fact that not all crimes have a
negative economic effect on society. Some crimes may actually have positive effects

12
on society for example Rosa Parks’s refusal to change seats on a city bus, but for the
analysis used in this paper it will make the assumption that the crime we are
discussing has a positive effect for the criminal they gain some utility as a result of
breaking the law, a negative effect for the victim(s) and the overall cost to society
will be less than or equal to zero. This next portion of this paper intends to prove
that there exist a cost minimizing point which will be most beneficial for a society in
expending resources to prevent criminal activity.
Creating a metric for measuring the impact of crime rates on society
In order to make this model work a few assumptions and definitions need to
be established; first crime in our model is defined as an act by some actor within
society that is both deemed as a social bad, and that society is willing to allocate
resources towards the prevention of said action. Second that crime is nonincreasing with increased crime control resources (L), third with no crime control
measures in place society would be at a suboptimal position. These assumptions are
made because it reflects an optimal strategy in the real world. First if a society was
at an optimal position with no crime resources expenditures it would signify one of
two things; that the expenditures were redundant because no crime exists in the
society, or that in each case crime control resources were used crime was always
non-decreasing, this would mean that nothing a society could use would deter
crime. The second assumption would mean that a society was not cost minimizers
and hence not utility maximizes therefore the society would be irrational. The
conclusion can be made that the total impact of crime on society is equal to the
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impact of crime plus the resources used to deter crime. Llad Phillips and Harold L
Votey Jr. in their book The Economics of Crime Control created a model for crime
control. The variables are the following socioeconomic causal factors (SE), create a
vector of m degrees of felony offenses (OF), m represents the specific type of felony
offenses. Societal programs (SP) which are used to diminish the socioeconomic
factors that create criminals, examples of these societal programs would range from
transfer payments that help low income households, intercity youth leagues for at
risk youth, or even the civilian conservation corps, intended to placate youth during
economic hardships at the time of the Great Depression. The costs of the societal
programs are indicated by C1(SP) this is born by society via the criminal justice
system. (L) is a vector of resources used by the criminal justice system, L represents
resources used for law enforcement and prosecution, e.g. police salaries, cost of
prisons, and the purchase and maintenance of police vehicles. L is a (n) dimensional
vector where n represents the number of resources available to prevent crime. The
conviction ratio (CR) is a measure of the “certainty” of punishment, CR is seen as a
deterrent along with the severity (SV), usually measured as the time of the sentence
served. The cost associated with the severity is represented as C2(SV). Given a set
level of felony offenses (OF), an increase in L would increase CR. Making the
assumption that that more money spent on crime control given a fixed level of crime
will result in more criminals being successfully prosecuted. (w) is the vector of cost
associated with L. w is a n dimensional vector with each subgroup of cost associated
with the corresponding subgroup in L, for example L2 is associated w2, to illustrate
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this point with a practical example lets assume that L2 is an individual that could
work as a police officer, w2 would represent the forgone benefits to society losses to
have that person stopping crime, so if he could have been a sculpture, w2 represents
the number of sculptures not made because the person was deterring crime. This
paper make the further restriction that each good or service in L

where 1

here represents the upper bound of the possible resources that could be used in
crime prevention. Zero is the lower bound because we are assuming that there
cannot be negative resources allocated to crime control using this and the
assumption made before that 0 is a suboptimal solution therefore L
represents the area allowable for an optimal solution we are insured that we have
an interior solution. The crime imposes a cost to society either through the loss or
damage of property, or through the cost in terms of loss of safety, later in this paper
we will use a metric created to measure the loss in monetary terms. The loss rate
(r) is the implied social costs. (r) is a vector of m values corresponding with OF
Thus the total cost to society (S) is calculated through the following formula:
S=rOF + wL + C1(SP) + C2(SV)
(Equation 1)
Figure 1 (appendix) is a reproduction of Llad Phillips, and Harold L Votey Jr.
explanation of these variables which allows the reader to have a visual
understanding of the variables. (Phillips & Votey, Jr., 1981)
The offense rate is a determined by a function of the conviction ratio, severity
of punishment and socioeconomic causal factors (g). Socioeconomic factors are
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determined by a function of social programs (h). And the conviction ratio is
determined by a function of the offense rate (f)
OF = g(CR, SV, SE)
SE = h(SP)
CR = f(OF,L)
(Equation 2)
We are placing the following assumptions on our functions.

(Equation 3)
From the derivations of equation 2 you can see that a full partial derivative of L will
dictate that an increase in L will cause a decrease in OF, and increase in SP will cause
a decrease in OF, and from the above partial derivatives we see that an increase in
SV will decrease OF. This means that if there are more crimes committed it would
be harder to prosecute any one crime given a set of constrained resources, if we
increase those resources but keep the number of crimes constant then we would be
more likely to prosecute any one crime committed. Also it shows that crimes would
decrease if the person committing the crime was more likely to be prosecuted for
committing the crime, if the penalty for committing the crime would go up or if
there were more social economical programs in place to prevent the creation of
criminals. This indicates that there are three ways to decrease the amount of crime
committed.
1. Increase criminal justice resources (L)
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2. Increase social programs (SP)
3. Increase the severity of punishment (SV)
(Phillips & Votey, Jr., 1981)
We also make the assumption that the functions are quasi-concave. This
assumption is created because of non-increasing returns to scale. If society is
rational they will allocate resources on those resources that will have the largest
economic benefit for crime prevention. Using this assumption we know that an
optimal solution to this problem does exist.
Proof:
By creating a Lagrangian from equations 1 and equation 2 and taking the minimum

taking the first order conditions with respect to our choice variables OF, L, SV and
SE gives you (and assuming that r and L are scalars).

Remember that g is the functional form of the offense rate, F is the functional form
of the conviction ratio. From equation 3 we know

is negative and

is positive therefore the second term is negative, because it is subtracted it becomes
a positive. We also know that

is negative. The left hand side of the equation is

positive however, because both w* and r* are positive, therefore
) ≥ abs(
between abs

). And w* becomes larger or r* becomes smaller the difference
) and

gets larger.
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Removing the scalar assumption we have [w]•[r]-1 =
We know that the f function is convex because of the assumptions we made in the
model which is sufficient to prove that this optimal point is a minimum or a set of
points which constitute a minimum.
Using these assumption we have proven that there is an optimal point to
which resources should be spent to minimize the cost of crime on a society.
We will now see how the model compares to the real world.
Determining r
As mentioned in the introduction it is very difficult to determine the loss a
society incurs as a result of crime because the loss is not only monetary, but
psychological as well. There have been a number of studies to try to express this
loss in monetary terms alone. This includes the Wickersham Report, The
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967,
however for this paper we will use the Sellin Wolfgang measure. In 1964 Sellin and
Wolfgang produced a study that is still widely used today to determine the
monetary weights on a society. They conducted an extensive survey to determine
the seriousness of a particular crime by asking survey respondents consisting of
judges, police officers and university students to give a numerical value for the
crime according to a list of 141 different crimes. If we combine their information
with the President’s Commission Report then we are able to gain some intuition
regarding the real cost of offenses. This paper is reproducing the methodology for
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finding the value associated with the Sellen-Wolfgang study and will later prove that
the President’s Commission Report is no longer a feasible option for obtaining the
values for r. The Sellin-Wolfgang score for petty theft of $5 has a mean magnitude
scale value of 22.09, this score is 69.13 for larceny of $5000 along that spectrum
there is a linear relationship between the logarithms of the Selling Wolfgang Score
and the dollar value loss. By using this Phillips and Votey were able to create a
monetary value for each of the crimes listed in Sellin Wolfgang study, an example of
that survey with their corresponding economic cost is found in the index of this
paper. (Sellin & E., 1978) (Phillips & Votey, Jr., 1981)
Using this data we can create a measurement of our rOF value. We are able
to do this by using data from the United States Department of Criminal Justice which
keeps track of federal crimes prosecuted each year. We then are able to use the
Phillips-Votey method for calculating social cost for the crime mentioned above. We
can compare this cost for crime prevention, which we calculated as the average per
person cost spent on the criminal justice program.
Although this list omits a number of less severe crimes that are subtracting
from society; this study looks exclusively at: murder and non-negligent
manslaughter, aggravated assault, property crimes, burglary, larceny and motor
vehicle theft, now taking those values and standardizing them by using the
consumer price index (CPI) to the 1993 cost level, and comparing them against the
cost spent on crime prevention for 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006 standardized
them by using the 1993 CPI we are able to determine that the social cost of crime
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decreases and at the same time spending on crime prevention increases. In this
particular case m=6 If we multiply the probability of being a victim of a crime by
cost associated with the crime we find that the total cost of crime is around $252.71
the same individual would spend $131 on crime prevention. In 1997 the social cost
of crime was $206.71 per person. The average cost for crime prevention was
$135.05. In 2000 the cost of crime dropped to $171.99 and society spent $150.21.
In 2003, crime cost $169.07 and society spent $157.07in prevention. In 2006 the
cost of crime $162.85, and prevention cost $181.2 per person. Looking at the data it
is possible to see that for every year the data is available in the United States, there
has been a decrease in crime and an increase in crime prevention. Now the United
States is spending more on preventing crime then the cost of crime is imposing on
individuals in society. As long as we take the assumption that society is optimizing
we can assume that the cost of crime is born by more than just the individuals
impacted by the crime. There may be a number of reasons for this, people may be
more aware of crime because of increased media coverage of crime, and so people
not affected by the crime feel less safe with each crime committed because they are
more aware of it (see appendix table 1 for data from original Sellin-Wolfgang study).
Comparison of Crime Control Resource Expenditure to Loss Due To Crime
Year
Crime Control
Resource
Expenditures

Loss Due to
Crime

1993

1997

2000

2003

2006

$131

$135.05

$150.21

$157.07

$162.85

$252.71

$206.71

$171.99

$169.07

$181.2
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Total Cost to
$383.71
$341.76
$322.20
$326.24
Society
(CPI provided by United States Department of Labor)

$344.05

Obviously with a fixed cost of crime control resources and decreasing crime
we would expect that the United States would not increase spending on crime
control. This paper will now look at possible causes of this seemingly irrational
behavior.
Hypothesis: The Value of Life has increased faster than inflation
The possible explanation for this would be an increase in the value of a
human life. Recall the Sellin Wolfgang study used the presidential commission
report which created a value of statistical life (VSL) to create the monetary cost of
homicide. There has not been a reproduction of the VSL by a presidential
commission report since the 1967 study, but there have been a number of studies
conducted since that time from various federal agencies. The Environmental
Protection Agency in their report Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for Existing
Stationary Compression Ignition Engines changed their VSL from 6.3 million to 9.1
Million, well above the changes because of inflation to the determined value of life in
the value of life study in the Presidential Commission. The Food and Drug
Administration also increased the VSL from $5 million in 2008 to 7.9 million this
year. And the Transportation department increased the VSL from $3.5 million to
$6.1 million. This shows that a number of federal agencies have increased the value
of life during that time. With an increase at the top of the Sellin Wolfgang
measurement, recall that the Sellin Wolfgang used the value of life created by the
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presidential commission to determine what the value of murder is, the cost of crime
would increase throughout the entire spectrum of values. (Sinha, Depro, & Braun,
2010) (Appelbaum, 2011)
Understanding SE
Throughout much of the literature regarding crime generation and crime
control, many authors point to a black box of social economic factors having a large
impact on crime generation. Phillips and Votey point to it directly as the single
cause of crime generation (see figure 1 appendix), but there has been little said
about the specifics of the social economical cause for crime generation. One possible
explanation is that people are driven to commit crime out of desperation, and if a
society increased its resources to members of its society then that society would
have fewer members causing crime, because of decreased competition for those
resources. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is as follows, with increased
resources of normal goods received by an individual the marginal demand for that
good diminishes, if the marginal benefit of the item is high then the marginal cost a
person is willing to pay increases. If we assume that we can monetize societal
punitive measures such as a prison sentence, and the perceived odds of a person
getting caught (and assuming that the individual is risk neutral and does not need
increased incentives to participate in the action). The cost of the act would be the
cost associated with the punitive measure multiplied by the chance of getting
caught. This may be an economically viable solution for a criminal in a Jean Valjean
situation in which an individual marginal benefit for stealing bread (life for him and
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his family), but in which resources are plentiful and the cost of not stilling the bread
is missing a meal as opposed to starving to death the individual may not be willing
to take the risk because the marginal benefit is lower. This would lead us to believe
that decreased per capita GDP would cause increased crime.
The Economist presented evidence, at least in the United States of decreased
crime rates associated with decreased GDP for the past recession. In order to find
the impact that per capita GDP has on crime, this paper looked at a data set of per
capita GDP produced by the University of Pennsylvania to make my calculations of
changes in crime with regards to the percentage change in GDP. This paper looked
at crime rates in both India and the United States to determine the effect that the
annual change in real GDP has on crime rates. The author of this paper chose those
two countries because of the robust internal data set that they collect and because
they represent a developed nation along with a developing nation. This is important
to see if there is a point, possibly after all of the basic resources (food, shelter, and
water) have been meet that an individual is not influenced by the desire to break the
law in order to meet the high marginal benefits that the increased resources will
allocate to that person. These two countries have many similarities, they have
representative government, they both have a similar legal system with the basis of
the law being common law. They both have the same three branches of
government. And although they have a few parts of their society that are different
(e.g. caste system, legal corruption) the most significant difference is poverty rates.
Comparing these two countries allows us to determine whether a country with a
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high level of poverty has the same response to that of a country with low levels of
poverty (poverty being defined as an annual income of less than 3000 a year). The
Bureau of Justice Statistics provided data for the crime rates in the United States.
The data for India is derived from the National Crime Records Bureau. (The
Economist Online, 2011) (Heston, Summers , & Aten, 2011)
When preforming the OLS regression of crime with respect to change in per
capita GDP, normalizing GDP in 2007 terms we find that in the United States when
we run a normal OLS regression we get a coefficient of .09, but the adjusted R2 is
only 0.0389 if we make an adjustment to fractional logit model it becomes 4.52 with
a std error of 2.62. This becomes significant at the .1 level, but our Adjusted R2
decreases. This shows very weak evidence that increases in the change of per capita
GDP increases crime.
Table 2 Fractional logit regression of total crime on change in GDP in U.S.A.
Coefficient

Estimate

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

-.3190
(.1702)
4.5211
(2.6249)

-1.848

.0670

1.722

.0914

Change in GDP
Adjusted R2 0.03859

Table 3 Fractional Logit Regression of Burglary on change in GDP in U.S.A.
Coefficient

Estimate

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

-.8412
(.2428)
15.2854
(3.7441)

-2.365

.00112

4.082

.000168

Change in GDP
Adjusted R2 0.2423
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Table 4 Fractional Logit Regression of Murder on change in GDP in U.S.A.
Coefficient

Estimate

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

-.0574
(.0049)
.2863
(.0759)

11.675

.0000

3.772

.0004

Change in GDP
Adjusted R2 0.2125

When this paper look at violent crime it saw that the change of per capita
GDP using an OLS regression gives us a negative coefficient of -.0059 but the
adjusted R2 is .0031 and the coefficient is not significant so there should not be any
conclusion drawn from this regression. The fractional logit regression shows a still
negative coefficient, but the adjusted R2 is negative so there does not seem to by any
relation between change in per capita GDP and violent crime.
When this paper look at crime with a possible monetary gain it reported that
OLS regression gives us a coefficient of -.0017 with a standard error of .008 but the
adjusted R2 is negative so we cannot find any correlation there. We get similar
results with our fractional logit regression, it seems as though there is no
correlation between monetary crime and changes in per capita GDP.
Although the relationships between monetary crimes and change in per
capita GDP seem spurious, this paper is able to see a few significant sub categories
of nonmonetary crime. When we perform a fractional logit regression on the per
capita burglary on per capita change in GDP we can see that it is positive at a
significant level. This suggests that as the rewards from burglary increases because
people have more money, because of these increased rewards criminals will be
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more likely to rob. Property crime also increases with increased GDP. When we
look at murder we also see strong evidence that changes in per capita GDP effect
murder. The Adjusted R2 was .1773 and was shown to be significant at 99%. This
suggests that increases in per capita GDP causes murder to increase. This allows us
to gain some insight into the cause of the spurious relationship between the changes
in per capita GDP and changes in monetary crime. The subcategories that have the
largest effect on the regression theft had spurious results when it was regressed
against changes in GDP. From the data this paper used in the United States overall
crime seems to be spurious with changes in GDP but certain subsectors of crime (i.e.
burglary and murder) increase with increase GDP.
Quantifying the results in India is a little more difficult because we are
looking at IPC (India Penal Code) level crime or crime that is prosecuted at the
national level, there have been a number of crimes that have become classified IPC
in the last 50 years. This effects our model in two different ways first it increases
the total amount of crime committed after the new classification is determined
second some of the crimes that were characterized as one type of crime or placed in
the Other IPC crime category now have a new placement which causes sudden shifts
in the subcategories when we incorporate the new category. For example setting
fire to somebody’s house in India in 1970 may have been considered as part of riot,
murder, other ICP or just prosecuted at the Local and Special Law level (LSL) which
is basically the provincial level in 1970, but when Arson became a category in the
ICP in 1995 it pulled from all of those categories depending on how the criminal
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justice system found would be the most advantageous way to prosecute the crime.
In an effort to correct for this this paper will look at crime at the larger scale of
monetary and nonmonetary gains. This should mitigate the effects caused by
pulling things across categories, but it does nothing to ameliorate the effect of
pulling crimes from LPL to IPC. So this paper will also look at a few subcategories
that have information for a larger period of time are affected less by the
introduction of a new category (i.e. murder, counterfeiting and rape). (National
Crime Records Bureau, 2009)
Running the regression from 1972 to 2009 allowed us to get results from our
OLS regression of -3.786 *10-4 which suggests that we have a negative coefficient
our standard error is 3.267*10-4 and our R2 is .0094 which is rather low as well.
When we use a fractional logit model with v = .003 (v represents the upper limit to
the model, the definition of v for the fractional logit model is defined better in the
next section for readers not familiar with the variables defining the fractional logit
model) we get a model that shows that our coefficient is negative and it is not
significant at any level. Our R2 is still very low at .011. In an effort to get more
accurate results we will look at murder and burglary by themselves to determine if
change in GDP has an effect on crime. This result is likely from the change in
classification of the data.
When we look at murder and burglary alone we find using a fractional logit
model again that increases in the change of GDP decreases murder this finding is
significant at the 99% the standard error is .697 so unlike in the United States
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periods of increased economic growth causes Indians to kill less not more. When
we run the fractional logit model with burglaries we find the same thing as in the
United States. Burglaries increase with positive changes to real GDP. Therefore
widespread poverty is likely not the cause of burglary, more likely the financial
reward resulting from the burglary is the cause of burglary.
Table 5 Fractional Logit Regression of crime on change in GDP in India
Coefficient

Estimate

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

.0019
(.0000)
-.0004
(.0003)

82.926

.0000

-1.159

.2550

Change in GDP
Adjusted R2 0.0097

Table 6 Fractional Logit Regression of burglary on change in GDP in India
Coefficient

Estimate

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

-.4141
(.1408)
-.0004
(1.9957)

-2.941

.0059

2.451

.01955

Change in GDP
Adjusted R2 0.1251

Table 7 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on change in GDP in India
Coefficient

Estimate

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

-.0067
(.0492)
-1.6623
(.6978)

0.136

.8923

-2.382

.0229

Change in GDP
Adjusted R2 0.143

Expanding the model internationally
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From equation 2 we were able to determine

where g is the

functional form of OF. Because r is fixed see appendix table 1 and S=rOF + wL +
C1(SP) + C2(SV) (equation 1) and SP=h(SE). It is important to determine SE which
will have the largest effect on OF resulting in the lowest S possible. So we need to
determine what aspect within SE which would cause the largest change in

.

Because the objective is determine the universal social economical causes of crime,
this paper needed to find a criminal offense that would be determined in a similar
manner in each of the criminal justice programs, was legally defined in each country
as nearly the same thing, and for which we would be able to derive universal
statistics. The best crime for that is murder. Unlike other crimes it is universally
described in the same way. Also unlike other crimes which end up going unreported
at a higher degree if the victims do not believe that the criminal justice system will
produce results, murders unlike a number of white collar crimes are highly
noticeable and visible. It has the added benefit of representing the largest price
vector in r, which would make it a strongly correlated with rOF. This paper would
like to acknowledge the fact that extracting data from many different sources may
cause a bias in the data. This paper attempted to mitigate the bias by extracting my
data from a single source. The United Nations keeps track of all murders; they
extract this data from the World Health Organization, Interpol, and the host
countries crime reporting agencies. Because these sources were not always the
same this paper used reports from the World Health Organization first, followed by
the any other international organization, if that was not available, this paper used
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domestic data, this paper would like to acknowledge the fact that when all three
data sources were available there existed slight variations between the sources. The
United Nations had only has available data from 2003 on, this caused a limit to the
sample size. Having stated this, the data analyzed in this paper still has a robust
sample size consisting of 290 different samples. Any regression conducted may
have omitted some of the data if the independent variables were not in our dataset.
In order to determine the coefficients which have the largest impact on crime
generation we need to look at existing models and theories. Rosenfeld and Messner
in their paper, the Social Sources of Homicide in Different Types of Societies were able
to extract from the existing literature the leading causes of homicide. A large
amount of the existing literature looks toward inequality leading to a large level of
lethal violence. The argument is that as inequality increases in a society there is a
large divide that separates the decision makers from the masses. The law is
therefore ineffective for protecting the masses and so they often take punitive
measures themselves. He later states that Knauft has found that simple societies
(smaller less developed societies) which are extremely egalitarian often have
similar acts of aggression because of the low likelihood of other punishment
occurring from a government actor. The other aspects that effect homicide are
disorganization measures, things that cause sudden changes to moral codes or even
population density. He also hints at the possibility of envy by the people less
wealthy masses. Another aspect that Rosenfeld and Messner mention that may
have an impact on crime are complexity measures such as political authority,
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judicial authority, and organizational complexity. This reasoning for this is similar
to that of the inequality aspect, Rosenfeld and Messner state that determines
whether or not the members of the society believe that the society has the ability to
take punitive actions against offenders. If they do not believe that they do then it is
likely their criminal justice system will take action against criminals they will do so
themselves. One interesting aspect to consider here is that when an individual and
not a society is to extract criminal justice by themselves it almost invariably results
in afflicting pain or death on the criminal. The reason for this is because the cost to
the individual seeking justice would be too large for any other means. (Rosenfeld &
Messner, 1991)
Steven Raphael presented data which indicated that unemployment
decreases the amount of crime, but violent crime increases because of decreased
employment. Raphael used a normal OLS regression to create these findings across
the United States, and then preformed a two stage least square to indicate the effect
that crime has on unemployment. This paper will reproduce the study across all
nations, but because the OLS regression is not an ideal regression across this data
(the dependent variable only deals in the positive realm and the dependent
variables also are not continuous (

n+).

There cannot be a negative number of

murders or even 1/3 of a murder). This may be the reason for the low R2 results
from the Raphael paper. In an effort to correct for this, this paper used a fractional
logit model. By doing so the resulting coefficients have a loss of accuracy, but we are
able to better determine whether or not an independent variable has a positive or
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negative effect on the dependent variable with more accuracy then with the OLS
regression. (Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 2001)
The linear form of the fractional logit model used in this paper is ln(Y/(v–
Y)=β’X + U, where v is the upper bound of the dependent variable. The dependent
variable is murders per 100,000 people the obvious upper cap would be 999,999;
but that would not constitute a good upper bound, because it is beyond the scope of
realistic estimates. A more accurate upper bound for these societies with regards to
the homicide rate is 80. If we look at our dataset it becomes clear as to the
reasoning for the rate. Obviously 80 murders per year is well above the highest
amount in the data set, but looking at the data set 80 is still a feasible number, it also
allows for some of the higher data sets to have a positive coefficient. This is
important because it allows us to gain some efficiency because after the data
manipulation the fractional logit model is increasing its R2 through turning into an
OLS regression. The obvious shortfall is that because we are using a fractional logit
model we will have estimators with little to no meaning they are not the coefficient
that fit the model, the most important aspect that we are determining is the sign of
the estimators. Also because the outliers have a significant effect on the model
countries like Columbia have a large effect on the regression (see figure 2 appendix)
the author of this paper considered omitting these data points because of the strong
impact they have on the model but decided against it because it would bias the
model. This paper just want the reader to be aware of this point.
Results of our model
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In order to test to see if Rosenfeld and Messner were correct when said that
monetary inequality has an effect on our model, this paper used the Gini coefficient
determined by the World Bank as an independent variable. This paper selected the
Gini index as a measure for inequality because it shows the distribution of
consumption, the lower the coefficient the more egalitarian the society. Then the
author of this paper averaged the murders by all of the years available for that
country. Figure 3 (appendix) was the result. The data looks as though as the Gini
coefficient increases murder increases as well. This means that as a country
becomes less equal in their distribution of wealth, their rate of murder increases.
With an OLS regression we get a coefficient of .8103 and a standard error of .1458.
R2 is .374 it is significant at the 99.9% level. When we use fractional logit model we
get a positive coefficient at the 99.9% level as well which shows strong evidence
showing that this coefficient is positive.
Table 8 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on Gini Index Worldwide
Coefficient

Estimate

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

-23.2552
(5.6206)
-.8103
(.1458)

-4.138

.0001

5.556

.0000

Gini
Adjusted R2 0.374

When we look at the legal system of each country we are able to gain an idea
of the effectiveness of their judicial system. Using the Economist Intelligence Unit to
look at the legal and regulatory risk factors, we are able to obtain an overall picture
of how their judicial system works. The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks the legal
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system according to how “fair” their judicial system is. The higher the number the
more corrupt it is. The Economist Intelligence Unit looks at how likely a person is to
get an impartial trial, how likely a person is able to avoid prosecution because of
people they know, or the individual’s influence from their wealth. It also looks at
the likelihood of a person going to jail because of political retaliation. When we run
a fractional logit model on this we see that the Gini index is still significant and that
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s assessment of legal and regulatory risk is also
significant at the 95%. By combining the two we get an adjust R2 of .4498.
Table 9 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on Gini Index and legal risk
worldwide
Coefficient
Estimate
t value
Pr(>|t|)
Intercept
Gini
Law

-7.1822
(.0948)
-.0948
(.0175)
.0120
(.0060)

-11.061

.0000

5.418

.0000

2.009

.0503

Adjusted R2 0.4498
This finding suggest that Rosenfeld and Messner were correct the higher the
inequality and the higher the less efficient the judicial system the higher the murder
rate. (See appendix for econometric coding using R)
Looking at Steven Raphael’s paper when this paper replicated his OLS model
utilizing a fractional logit model, and expanding it to cover 49 countries this paper
was able to still obtain a positive coefficient with regards to the unemployment
coefficient, this suggests that the coefficient is truly positive and that unemployment
does cause murders to increase. This is significant at the 99.9%.
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Table 10 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on unemployment, inequality, and
legal risk worldwide
Coefficient
Estimate
t value
Pr(>|t|)
Intercept
Unemployment

-4. 227
(.1633)
.1350
(.0180)

-22.885

.0000

7.517

.0000

Adjusted R2 0.164
In an effort to make the model even more robust, this paper combined both
Raphael’s and Rosenfeld idea to see what would happen if we perform a fractional
logit model to look at the effect that inequality, unemployment, and judicial and
regulatory instability would have on the murder rate. Because the World Bank is
sporadic about collecting data to create the Gini Index this paper was able to create
its own measure of inequality. The design of my inequality index is quite separate
from that of the Gini index, where the Gini index creates a number based on the
inequality of consumption, my index is based off the idea that the larger the
deviation from the income class that hold the majority the higher the number. So if
there is a society with a large number of households in one income group and
another large portion of a society in a much more affluent income group, whereas
the political elites in the higher income group would likely have more influence in
law making and implementation, this country would have a very high inequality
value. For example apartheid South Africa would have a very large inequality value,
where as a country that was more or less in the same income group such as
Indonesia or the Czech Republic would have a low inequality value. This value
already has transfer payments included. When this paper ran that regression it find
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that unemployment is significant at the 99.9%, as well as legal and regulatory risk,
both of those coefficients are positive. Inequality is also positive, but only at the
95%. The R2 value is .3395.
Table 11 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on unemployment, law and
inequality worldwide
Coefficient
Estimate
t value
Pr(>|t|)
Intercept
Unemployment
Inequality
Law

-5.427
(.0367)
.0959
(.0021)
.0001
(.0001)
.0269
(.0043)

-14.881

.0000

4.586

.0000

1.661

.0984

6.314

.0000

Adjusted R2 0.3395
This finding shows evidence Raphael, Rosenfeild and Messer were right even
if we expand our study across multiple countries and we use the fractional logit
model. This evidence suggest that social economical programs that use transfer
payments to make society more monetarily equal and programs that increase
employment could be used to decrease the murder rates world wide.
Effectiveness of Prisons
A significant portion of the prison population is repeat offenders. There is a
50.1% chance that a released prisoner would be return to prison within 3 years. By
reducing the amount of recidivism states have the opportunity to retard this
mounting demand for prison space. A number of costly measures are available to
decrease the likelihood of recidivism among prison populations. But the costs are
prohibitive, so in order for these programs to have the largest effect, a number of
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federal and local organizations have looked at the characteristics of inmates most at
risk of recidivism in order to allocate resources in the most effective manner
possible. In this portion of my paper we will look at the static characteristics of the
inmate population released in 1978, and attempts to isolate the characteristics of
prisoners who are most likely to return to prison. (Statistics, 2007) (Jacobson,
2005).
Using data collected from the North Carolina Prison system in 1977-78 and
again in 1979-1980 by Schmidt and Witte (1989) we are able to gain some intuition
as to the effectiveness of the prison system. Although this data is rather dated it
encompasses the most robust study this author could find with regards to the
effectiveness of the modern prison system.
The variables, selected by Schmidt and Witte, are not open to interpretation
and therefore difficult to manipulate. These variables are static by nature; a onetime look at the conditions a prisoner is facing at the time of his/her release. These
models can easily be carried over across studies because they are almost universally
defined in the same manner.
This data included all inmates released between the periods of 1977 to 1978
and 1979 to 1980. It included 9457 individuals, but only 8849 are not missing
information. Listed in the next section of the paper are the variables and their
definitions
White: A dummy variable equal to one for any race (including Oriental, Hispanic,
Native American) that is not of African descent.
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Alchy: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate’s record indicates a serious
problem with Alcohol.
Junky: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate’s record indicates a serious
problem with hard drugs.
Super: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate’s release was supervised
(he/she was release on parole).
Married: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate was married at the time of
his/her release.
Felon: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate was in prison for a felony.
Workrel: A dummy variable equal to one if the individual participated in the work
release program during their sentence.
Propty: A dummy variable which is equal to one if the crime committed was a crime
against property.
Person: A dummy variable equal to one if the crime committed was against a person
(the crime could have been against a person and property in which case both this
variable and propty would be one).
Male: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate is a male.
Priors: The number of previous incarcerations not including the sample prison term
School: The number of years of formal schooling completed
Rule: The number of rules broken by individual during their sentence
Age: The age (in months) of the inmate upon release.
Tservd: The time served (in months) of the sentence
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Recid: A dummy variable equal to one if the individual returned to jail within the
follow up period (three years)
Time: The amount of time from one the person was release to the point at which the
person returned to prison. If the person did not return to person within the three
years examined this variable is equal to zero.
There are a number of possible variables listed above that may be correlated,
this paper will address the issues here and explain what it did to decreased the
multicollinearity problem in order to get a better R2. It is safe to believe that Tservd
and Rule would be correlated because the longer a person is in prison the more
likely they are to break more rules the author of this paper divided rule by Tservd in
order to make it rules per month. This allowed us to normalize the number of rules
broken to be uncorrelated with how long a person was in prison. This paper also
tested correlation between age and marriage, this was not statistically significant.
Hypothesis
In order to understand the reason for recidivism across these variables this
paper created a constrained incentive structure.
Max U (v(π(s,i,r)), w(π(s,i,r)),βAt+1(p,u))
i,r,s,e

S.t.Ē=g(s,e,d)v(π(s,i,r))E[f(p,u)|At+1] h(p)
+w(π(s,i,r))E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]E[f(p,u)|At+1]
vπ ≥0, vππ ≤0, πs ≥0, πss ≤0, πi≥0, πii ≤0, πr ≥0, πrr ≤ 0 wπ≥0, wππ ≤0 gs≤0, gss ≤0, ge
≥0,gd≥0,gdd ≤ 0 ch ≥ 0, fp ≥ 0, fu≥0 ,Ap ≤0, Au ≤0,hp ≥0, ce ≤0,cp ≥0,cr ≥0
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(equation 4)
I will breakdown the reasoning behind the functional form of this model in
the next section, in this section this paper will concentrate solely on introducing the
parameters. This model suggests that an inmate is attempting to maximize their
utility (U) which is a function of the utility derived from the legal profits (v) and
illegal profits (w), along with the discounted utility derived from their next period
level of freedom (At+1) in our model this will be simplified to either free or in prison,
but this could theoretically allow for a person on probation, or under alternative
forms of incarceration such as house arrest. At+1 is a function of priors (p) and
amount of crime the criminal is engaged in (u). This paper also assume that profit
is modeled by the level of legal skills a person possess (s), such as literary, quantities
and technical skills, in our model this paper will use amount of schooling to be a
proxy for this, the amount of illegal skills a person has such as fraud, scamming, and
hacking (i), and the level of risk a person is willing to engage in (r).
Next this paper created a constraint in the level of effort a person in willing
to engage in, this constraint could represent how many hours that person works in a
day (E). The constraint is made up of the disutility function derived from using
effort to gain money (g), this disutility function is a function of the level of effort put
forth (e), the level of schooling an individual has (s) and the amount of
discrimination which exists for the individual(d). This is multiplied by the amount
of utility from legal profits, and then multiplied by the expected value family
function this condition function is conditional on the value in the next period’s

40
situation (E[f(p,u)|At+1]). This is then multiplied by the housing function which is a
function of priors (h(p)).
The next aspect of our model is the associated cost function of illegal
activities, which is the expectation of their chance of getting caught conditional on
the amount of illegal activity the criminal is pursing and the level of illegal skills the
criminal has (E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]). This paper assumes that the expectation of the
chance of getting caught is a function of hubris, effort, priors, and level of risk the
individual is engaging in, multiplied by the expectation of the family function in the
next period.
Intuition for expected signs and magnitudes of parameter estimates
The model was created through interpretation of possible utility functions
derived from explanations of criminal activity given by existing literature. First it is
important to separate the utility derived from the legal utility function and the
illegal utility function in order to create a separate cost function, but the profit
obtained from the two different activities may be different as well.
Some criminals gain utility from the excitement of breaking the law. At the same
time some criminals may feel guilty for breaking the law. Because of this this paper
assumes that criminals would have different utility function derived from two
different profit making activity, and this value may be different even though they
obtain the same amount of profit. In both of these cases this paper expects that the
first derivative of the profit function would be positive. The third aspect of the
utility function is their state of being in the next period; the main purpose of prisons

41
is to be punitive. Because this paper is looking at a static optimization problem, this
paper assumes that the amount of prison time the individual faces in the next period
would cause a decrease in utility. The amount of time the person faces is
determined by two different aspects; the type and amount of crime the criminal is
convicted of, and with the introduction of the three strike program (a program that
significantly increases punishment for criminals that have two previous crimes), the
number of prior convictions. This would cause At+1 to be negative in both u and p.
The reason why the cost function incorporates the family is because the
expected cost from the family function associated with legal activities may decrease
the cost associated with pursuing legal profits. The Vera Institute of Justice found
that
”families provide critical support early on… [recently released prisoners]
received financial support from them as well. Family members helped to
locate work and encouraged abstinence from drugs and compliance with
treatment…Offenders whose families accepted and supported them also have
a higher level of confidence and were more successful and optimistic for their
future.”
So if in the next period the individual is free then this paper expects that the family
function would have a value between 0 and 1 which would decrease the overall cost
function associated with legal profits. (Petersilia, 2003)
The family function also may increase the cost function associated with the
illegal activity value function this is very prominent with female prisoners. Lipsey
and Derzon found that the separation of a mother from her child was cited by the
mother to be one of the most difficult aspects of imprisonment. This would suggest
that if a person is expect in the next period to be separated from their family
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because they are participating in crime that the family function would add to cost
making it a value greater than one. (Petersilia, 2003)
The reason why the effort utility function incorporates discrimination is
because many professions discriminate against former prisoners.
“There is a serious stigma attached to a criminal history – particularly a
prison record in the legal labor market, and ex-offenders are often shut out
from legitimate jobs. Surveys of employers reveal a great reluctance to hire
felony offenders…Even if ex-prisoners are able to find a job there is a
substantial impact on future earnings (about 30 percent lower), and firms
willing to hire ex-offenders tend to offer lower wages and fewer benefits”
(Petersilia, 2003)
This would suggest that partial derivative of g with respect to d would be positive.
Housing also affects the cost structure of the legal utility profit function. Many
ex-prisoners experience a very difficult time finding suitable housing. Because of
parolee restrictions they are often not able to live with family and friends that have
any criminal history. They have an extremely difficult time finding any type of
private housing because apartments require first and last month’s rent plus a
security deposit. And when prisoners are release from prison they usually do not
have any money. While private housing represents 97 percent of the total housing
stock, a person still can try to obtain public housing, but most providers are
required to deny public housing to felons. This results in a large portion of former
prisoners to become homeless. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 12
percent of prisoners are homeless this becomes an issue because it decreases the
chance of employment and reintegration into society. A study by Bradley et al
suggest
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“Housing is the linchpin that holds the reintegration process together.
Without a stable residence, continuity in substance abuse and mental health
treatment is compromised. Employment is often contingent upon a fixed
living arrangement.” (Petersilia, 2003)
This would lead us to believe that the partial derivative of h with respect to d would
be positive.
As this paper examines the effort utility function it see that it is a function of
skill, effort, and discrimination. The reason why discrimination is included is
because it can have a large impact on the effort disutility function. This would cause
the partial derivate of d with respect to g to be positive.
“[race] affects every aspect of reentry; including communities labor markets,
family welfare, government entitlements, and program innovations, which
need to be culturally appropriate” “20 percent of black males will experience
a prison term before reaching age 35.” (Petersilia, 2003)
The reason why this paper included the s inside the g function in the effort
function is because low skill labor is usually associated higher levels of manual
labor. But s also affects both the profitability of legal and illegal activity. Finally this
paper has discounted value of next periods punishment multiplied by the chance of
getting caught as part of the cost function associated with illegal profits. We would
expect that the chance of getting caught would be determined by the person’s level
of illegal activity and skills associated with performing illegal activities. Because
this is an expectation operator we will expect that k which is the value inside of the
chance function associated with hubris. This would cause the partial derivate of c
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with respect to k to be negative. But when you look at risk as a function of the
chance function you would expect that the partial derivative to be positive.
Test statistics and conclusions from the hypothesis
From the theoretical model presented above our hypothesis is that the utility
structure for a normal prisoner would look like
Max U (v(π(s,i,r)), w(π(s,i,r)),βAt+1(p,u))
i,r,s,e

S.t.Ē=g(s,e,d)v(π(s,i,r))E[f(p,u)|At+1] h(p)
+w(π(s,i,r))E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]E[f(p,u)|At+1]
This would mean that we would have evidence that supports this model if Rule and
Male were determined to be positive, and white, married, and school were negative
because they have the largest one-sided effect on our model. This paper would also
expect that priors, Tserved would be near zero, or not significant because they are
influenced by both sides of the model.
Because this paper is working with a dichotomous dependent variable this
paper ran a probit and logit regression on the 1978 cohort in order to determine the
likelihood of recidivism. The Logit test achieved a higher prediction rate. The
coefficents of our logit model are listed in table 2. Of the variable listed in table 2 the
only ones that are significant at the 99% level are white, alchy, male, married,
person, priors, school, rule, age and tservd. Here is a table of the respective
coefficients. Note that because we ran a logit model the coefficents are most
important by telling the direction of the impact, if the coefficient sign is positive it
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has a positive it increases the likelihood of a criminal returning to prison, if it is
negative it decreases the likelihood.
Table 13 Results from Logit Regression 1978 Cohort
***Rule
***Male
***Alchy ***Priors TWorkrel

Junky

*Tservd

1.4354
(.3454)

.6301
(.1609)

.5648
(.0838)

.1675
(.0155)

.1283
(.0692)

.0727
(.0746)

.0179
(.0020)

Super

***Age

***School

Propty

*Married

*Person

*White

.0001
(.0750)

-.0046
(.0004)

-.0527
(.0147)

-.1141
(.0836)

-.1585
(.0788)

-.3190
(.0788)

-.5281
(.2727)

standard errors denoted in parenthesis.
*** indicates that is significant at.001 level, * it is significant .05 level, t it is
significant at .1 level
You can use these coefficients to compare against my model.
Max U (v(π(s,i,r)), w(π(s,i,r)),βAt+1(p,u))
i,r,s,e

S.t.E=g(s,e,d)v(π(s,i,r))E[f(p,u)|At+1] h(p)
+w(π(s,i,r))E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]E[f(p,u)|At+1]
vπ ≥0, vππ ≤0, πs ≥0, πss ≤0, πi≥0, πii ≤0, πr ≥0, πrr ≤ 0 wπ≥0, wππ ≤0 gs≤0, gss ≤0, ge
≥0,gd≥0,gdd ≤ 0 ch ≥ 0, fp ≥ 0, fu≥0 hp ≤0, ,Ap ≤0, Au ≤0,hp ≥0, ce ≤0,cp ≥0,cr ≥0
The first coefficient, rule, is positive so it increases the likelihood of a person
going to prison; it is also our best proxy for the w utility function, because it shows
the willingness that a prisoner has to break the law in order to get what he wants
inside of prison, this should also correspond to the willingness to break the rules to
achieve gain outside of prison. So as the weighted value of this utility function is
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high relative to the v utility function you would expect that the person would break
the law more often than someone with a lower w utility function, this would likely
cause the person to be arrested and thus increase recidivism. The next highest
positive coefficient is male, but to understand why this coefficient has such a high
value relative to the other variables we will look at it in terms of why being female
would cause a negative coefficient. If you recall from above one of the most difficult
aspects of prison for females is the separation from young children, this will
increase the cost function associated with E[f(p,u)|At+1] in the illegal activity side
because the At+1 would likely correspond to being in prison, this would have a larger
effect on most women then most men. Because the cost function is higher with
regard to utility gained from illegal activity you would expect a significant shift of
women with young children to the legal side. The model does not examine the
utility structure associated with vices, so won’t try to fully explain the impact that
alchy and junky has on our model, however, it is likely that the discount function (β)
increases therefore the punitive aspect associated with next period may not matter
as much as this moment’s benefit from participating in drug use. This analysis is
only relevant, however, in cases dealing with the use or pursuit of drugs. The next
largest positive coefficient is priors. This affects a few different areas, because
priors affects the disutility portion associated with our At+1 function You would
expect that portion to decrease future crime involvement, but at the same time it
would increase our i function. Petersillia explains why the i function would be
affected in her book When Prisoners come home.
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“Criminologists have long suggested that prisons breed crime, act as schools
for criminal learning, and produce a variety of criminogenic effects. People
who serve time in prisons often return home with stronger ties to other
criminals, greater criminal skills, and more antisocial attitudes…
imprisonment may actually serve to increase overall levels of crime in the
community. “
Because i affects the profit function associated with illegal skills, and decreases the
chance of getting caught, therefore, lowering the cost function utility from illegal
activities this would cause the ex-prisoner to shift to illegal activities. On top of that
is a third aspect outside our model criminals have lower life spans, and because they
die at a younger age, they have less opportunity to commit crime. Because priors
affects both disutility from committing crime and decreased cost of committing
crime you would expect that the coefficient would be low, and the model does not
predict the sign of priors well because it effects the cost function of both the legal
and illegal side. The sign of the coefficient is determined by which aspect
dominates. You would expect tservd to act the same way. The shortfall of the model
corresponds with workrel, the shortfall may be because in this model and the 1980
model this was determined not to be significant, so this paper need to collect more
data to do a more robust analysis, but the reason why it may not be positive is that
many work release programs do not increase legal skills. Many work release
programs are oriented towards low skill manual labor, thus not having any effect on
the model. Supervision was also not significant, however the author of this paper
ran an OLS regression on the inmate population which did return to jail against the
length of time they returned and found that supervision caused the length of time to
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be longer, supervision appears to increase the risk associated with getting caught
which increases the cost function of illegal activities but does not increase the
payout, but when the supervision ends the utility structure returns to normal. Age
is the next aspect, it is negative, but the negative aspect may correspond with
increased mortality rates, this may be one of the reasons why you see higher a
higher mean prison population today versus thirty years ago, as hospitalization
care, especially trauma care goes up, life expectancy has increased across the entire
population, but with better trauma care we would expect to see higher life
expectancy of incarcerated people. As for school we are using it as a proxy for legal
skills (s) this affects both profit functions, but it decreases g(•) which means the cost
function of legal profit decreases resulting in decreased recidivism. This
corresponds with the negative coefficient we get from the logit regression. This
model does not explain why crimes to property or to a person may decrease crime.
The married function increases the cost to illegal profits via the E[f(p,u)|At+1]
function, but it does not affect the legal profit cost function which is one reason why
we would expect it to have a negative coefficient on recidivism. The last coefficient
is white; in order to understand the coefficient associated with race we look at the
g(•) function because it is a proxy for discrimination we would expect that gd to be
increasing causing the cost associated with legal profit utility to increase. We would
expect to see a substitution to illegal profits as gd increases. When we ran the 1980s
data we achieved similar results.
Table 14 Results from Logit Regression 1980s Cohort
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***Rule

.98540
7
(.2519)

***Alchy

.436371
(.0647)

***Male

.41472
8
(.1387)

tWorkrel

.152354
(.0629)

***Priors

.145214
(.0132)

***Tservd

.012597
(.0015)

*Age

.00434
(.0004
)

***Scho

*Perso

***Marrie

***Whit

ol

n

d

e

-.05268
(.0135)

.12078
(.1012)

-.24991
(.0751)

-.36406
(.2485)

(standard errors in parenthesis) *** indicates that is significant at.001 level, * it is
significant .05 level, t it is significant at .1 level
We see similar magnitudes and orderings as in the previous case. In each
case we can see that variables that affect just one utility structure, without affecting
the other will have larger effects in either the positive or negative direction
depending on which cost structure they are affecting. Variables that affect both cost
structures tend to have coefficients closer to zero.
Both of these data sets support the Hypothesis. We have evidence that
supports this model if Rule and Male were determined to be positive, and white,
married, and school were negative because they have the largest one-sided effect on
our model. Priors and Tserved are near zero, or not significant because they are
influenced by both sides of the model.
Because the costs associated with changing different variables are not
uniform it would helpful to look at the marginal effects of the variables.
Table 15 Marginal Effects from Logit Regression
White

Alchy

Male

Super

Married

Propty

Priors

School

Rule

Age

Tservd

-.11443

.12918

.13989

-.00248

-.03533

-.01251

.03643

-.01051

.33718

-.00097

.00393

Although it would seem difficult to change some of these variables (white, male,
married) because we have the theoretical model we may be able to effect the
variables without changing them. For example, it would be difficult to change
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somebody’s race, but it would be less difficult to decrease discrimination through
community education and outreach programs, and affirmative action mandates.
According to the model this paper presented it would have similar effects. We could
affect the male variable via the family function, if prisons facilitated family visits we
may see a stronger tie to family which would cause larger effects via the
E[f(p,u)|At+1] function. And if prisons offered marriage counseling it would have an
effect on the E[f(p,u)|At+1] function as well. The most important aspect may be an
incentive scheme while in prison which rewards a prisoner who follows to rules.
Supervision
Because there was not a carefully selected control group which determined
which criminals from our study were released with supervision in the Schmidt and
Witte data set, the results were partially biased. In the Schmidt and White case
study the selection was based on the crime and personality of the crime. However
to get a better look at how Supervision may affect our model We will look at a Metaanaysis conducted by Douglas Lipton Robert Martinson and Judith Wilks in their
book The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment A Survey of Treatment Evaluation
Studies (1976) . They performed a meta-analysis of a series of studies with regards
to the effect of probation on both young (13-18) and older offenders. After
examining 17 studies which totaled about 20,000 subjects they were able to
determine that with randomly assigned probation supervision, children with more
intense supervision, meaning that the probation officer working with the child had
less than 16 case loads, compared to the control in which the probation officer had a
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case load of 50-101, were less likely to return to prison. Because of the randomness
of the probation selection their study may be less biased. The results were lower
recidivism within the time period in which the case worker is working with the
individual. Increased supervision would increase the cost of the program, which
would cause an increase in our C1(SV) from the first equation and (E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u])
from the second equation. In fact on average the cost increased by 10 percent per
case load. We established that

(equation 3), and that

(equation 4)

which would indicate that this will cause a decrease in the amount of crime
produced. Lipton et al. concluded that “If the studies are pooled …all comparisons
indicate that younger offenders under intensive supervision performed better than
controls. (Lipton, Martinson, & Wilks, 1976)
In the only cost study conducted by the group of surveys examined by Lipton
et al, we find that intense supervision for girls had a greater decrease in the cost of
crime prevention, Steward Adams (1965) found that in his study of young women in
the criminal justice system that the control group cost $240 a month, which
accounted for supervision, detention and placement cost compared to $185 for the
group that was in the intensive supervision group.
Time Served
Similar to the Supervision variable time served may be biased because of the
fact that those criminals with longer time served are likely to have participated in
more crime in their past, and the crime they committed had a larger impact on the
social economical cost the society pays for crime. The type of criminal with longer
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time served would be more likely to commit a crime in the future. So in order to get
intuition for unbiased results we can look at a case study in San Diego. In 1993 to
2001, San Diego was forced to cut their criminal justice budget, it also decreased
misdemeanor arrest by 1%, and prison sentences were reduced by 25%. During
this period of time violent crimes in San Diego decreased by 43%. During that same
period of time the nationwide average was a reduction by 23%. By looking at that
same time period we can see that of the states with the largest increases to prison
their prison population (i.e. Idaho, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Texas, Mississippi,
North Dakota, Montana, Tennessee, Colorado, and Utah) all of those states had an
increase in the percentage of violent crime above the national average. Of the 10
states with the lowest percent increase in prisoners all except two of those states
were below the national average. Because nothing changed with the nature of the
prisoners in any of these states this gives strong evidence that it the length of time
served which cause an increase in the probability of crime increasing. (Jacobson,
2005)
Conclusion
Using the Philip-Votey Model this paper was able to prove that there is an
optimal point in which resources should be allocated to minimize the cost of crime.
This paper then used the measurement for the cost of the offense function
introduced by the Philip-Votey model, the Sellin-Wolfgang measurement. This
measurement used the Presidential Commission report to create an upper bound
for the price vector. The Sellin-Wolfgang measurement then log linearized the
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results of their survey to determine the cost associated with each crime. This paper
showed that if we use the assumption that our society is optimizing their resources
the upper bound of this Sellin Wolfgang study is no longer correct, and the upper
bound would be higher and dynamically increasing each year.
The Phillip-Votey did not elaborate on the social economic causes which
cause crime generation. In order to determine what those causes are we looked at
the studies produced by Liska, Chamlin, and Reed in their book Testing the Economic
Production and Conflict Models of Crime Control showed that inequality, and racism .
Then this paper looked at Richard Rosenfeld and Steven Messner paper The Social
Sources of Homicide in Different Types of Societies, which showed that inequality and
ineffective legal system, cause increased levels of crime. Then we looked at Ralphael
Winter-Ebmer’s paper The Effect of Unemployment on Crime which showed
unemployment increases crime. This paper expanded the data internationally, and
uses a fractional logit model to increase efficiency. We use the hypothesis that
unemployment, inequality, and a corrupt legal system will cause increased crime.
This unemployment and a corrupt legal system was proven to significant at the
99.9%. Inequality was proven to be significant at the 90% level.
We then looked at the sector of society that had the largest effect on the cost
of crime control resources the prison system and created a hypothsis for the utility
structure faced by a prisoner
The Hypothesized model showed that the largest impact on whether or not a
criminal would return to committing crime were the demographics of associated
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with Rule and Male white, married, and school because they have the largest onesided effect on our model. This paper would also expect that priors, Tserved would
be near zero, or not significant because they are influenced by both sides of the
model. This is what our model show. This finding supports evidence that if a state
worked on shaping a criminal utility function with regards to payoffs of crime,
increasing family relations during time incarcerated, decreasing racism, and
increasing levels of schooling they should be able to have a lower recidivism rate
than by just increasing prison sentences.
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Appendix:
Figure 1
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Figure 1 shows the total cost of Society by crime between the years 1993-2006
Figure 2
Adaption of Phillips-Votey Figure 2.1 illustration A Schematic Illustration of Crime
Generation and Crime Cost
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This shows that as the number of offenses increases the conviction ratio will
decrease, this means that as more people commit crimes a lower percent of them
will be successfully convicted, without changes to the allotment of resources. The
second derivative shows that it is decreasing at a decreasing rate. The third
function shows that as resources for convictions increase the conviction ratio will
increase.

Figure 3
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This chart is the average number of murders per 100,000 people for the years we
have on record. It shows a thick clustering near the bottom of the chart, and the
majority (37 of the 51 countries represented) have a murder rate of less than five
people per 100,000 people. All except 9 countries are less than a murder rate of 10
people per 100,000 people. It is those remaining nine, Venezuela, Colombia, Spain,
Russia, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Chili, and Brazil which have a significant
impact on our model.
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Figure 4
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This shows how murders increase with a higher gini coefficient.

Table 16 Estimates of Social Loss Rates for 61 Offenses (in 1979 dollars): Derived by
Phillips and Votey
Homicide
Rape
Selling Heroin
Kidnapping-$1000 Ransom paid
Perjury
Assault-Victim Hospitalized
Robbery with Weapon
Arson-Set Fire to Garage
Incest-Intercourse with Sister
Robbery without Weapon
Assault-Victim Treated, Released
Larceny $12255

$360,729
$27,958.30
$11,278.20
$11,278.20
$7308.27
$6986.68
$5439.73
$5439.73
$3855.55
$3249.81
$1580.88
$1568.32
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Embezzled $1000 from Employer
Auto Theft
Offender Exposes Genitals in public
Burglary
Illegal Possession of Gun
Larceny $2451
Running a Gambling House
Check Fraud-Singing False Name
Incest-Intercourse with Stepdaughter
Passing Worthless Checks
Larceny between $100 and $2500
Larceny $122.55
Prostitute in House of Prostitution
Possession of Heroin
Larceny $49.02
Soliciting Act of Prostitution
Pimping
Embezzle $5.00
Selling Alcohol Illegally
Larceny $12.25
Dangerous Use of Firearms
Throwing a Rock Through Window
Receiving Stolen Property $100-$2500
Madam in House of Prostitution
Participating in Dice Game in Alley
Receiving Stolen Property <$100
Glue Sniffing
Juvenile Drunk on Street
False Fire Alarm
Prowler-Back Yard of Residence
Trespassing
Offender Takes Bets on Numbers
Customer: in House of Prostitution
Beyond Control of Parents
Parole Violation-Juvenile
Customer in Gambling House
Check Cashed: with Insufficient Funds
Obscene Phone Call
Game Law Violation
Incorrigibility
Loitering
Act of Prostitution
Wayward
Liquor Law Violation

$1435.26
$1,364.74
$938.68
$926.19
$917.61
$724.26
$412.02
$367.68
$295.61
$257.37
$242.63
$170.47
$111.24
$101.64
$110.78
$110.54
$85.68
$68.84
$62.54
$56.98
$47.22
$42.63
$23.83
$23.03
$21.58
$18.52
$18.52
$14.17
$13.28
$12.50
$10.32
$8.84
$7.50
$5.00
$5.00
$3.94
$3.39
$3.30
$1.98
$1.82
$1.15
$.82
$.73
$.66
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Runaway
Disturbing the Peace
Truancy
Vagrancy
Intoxicated in Public

$.57
$.45
$.15
$.09
$.07

Code for recidivism, and marginal effects
R code
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR")
dat<-read.table("NC1978right.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
fulldat<-read.table("NC1978right.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR")
M<-nrow(fulldat)
N<-ncol(fulldat)
olstest<-array(0,dim=c(M,N-4))
library(AER)
fit.lpm<-coef(summary(lm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + junky + super + married +
workrel + propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd, data=dat)))
fit.pro <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel +
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd,
family=binomial(link="probit"), data = dat)
fit.log<- glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel +
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd,
family=binomial(link="logit"), data = dat)
summary(fit.pro)
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summary(fit.log)
logLik(fit.pro)
logLik(fit.log)
results<-cbind(coef(fit.pro), coef(fit.log))
results
## compare against how long before they recidivised
M<-nrow(fulldat)
for(i in 1:M){
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,1]<-fulldat$white[i],olstest[i,1]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,2]<-fulldat$alchy[i],olstest[i,2]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,3]<-fulldat$male[i],olstest[i,3]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,4]<-fulldat$junky[i],olstest[i,4]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,5]<-fulldat$super[i],olstest[i,5]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,6]<-fulldat$married[i],olstest[i,6]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,7]<-fulldat$workrel[i],olstest[i,7]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,8]<-fulldat$propty[i],olstest[i,8]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,9]<-fulldat$person[i],olstest[i,9]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,10]<-fulldat$priors[i],olstest[i,10]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,11]<-fulldat$school[i],olstest[i,11]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,12]<-fulldat$rule[i],olstest[i,12]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,13]<-fulldat$age[i],olstest[i,13]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,14]<-fulldat$tservd[i],olstest[i,14]<-NA)
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,15]<-fulldat$time[i],olstest[i,15]<-NA)
}
ols<-na.omit(olstest)
fit<lm(ols[,15]~ols[,1]+ols[,2]+ols[,3]+ols[,4]+ols[,5]+ols[,6]+ols[,7]+ols[,8]+ols[,9]+ols
[,10]+ols[,11]+ols[,12]+ols[,13]+ols[,14])
summary(fit)
###Results
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 22.591576 3.777694 5.980 2.71e-09 ***
ols[, 1] -0.223891 0.895319 -0.250 0.802565
ols[, 2] -4.081673 1.084211 -3.765 0.000172 ***
ols[, 3] -1.218665 2.475544 -0.492 0.622584
ols[, 4] 0.446185 0.988934 0.451 0.651919
ols[, 5] 0.307782 1.000259 0.308 0.758346
ols[, 6] 2.897378 1.072397 2.702 0.006965 **
ols[, 7] -0.466555 0.929228 -0.502 0.615670
ols[, 8] -0.300868 1.111694 -0.271 0.786702
ols[, 9] 2.520027 2.136526 1.179 0.238365
ols[, 10] -0.708177 0.156360 -4.529 6.33e-06 ***
ols[, 11] 0.141753 0.205830 0.689 0.491114
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ols[, 12] -8.350294 4.343779 -1.922 0.054727 .
ols[, 13] 0.020194 0.005191 3.890 0.000104 ***
ols[, 14] -0.123017 0.019740 -6.232 5.80e-10 ***
fit.pro <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors +
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="probit"), data = dat)
fit.log<- glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors +
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="logit"), data = dat)
summary(fit.pro)
summary(fit.log)
logLik(fit.pro)
logLik(fit.log)
results<-cbind(coef(fit.pro), coef(fit.log))
## calculate marginal effects
# First for the Probit Model
k <- length(coef(fit.pro))
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.pro))
vars <- c("white", "alchy", "male","super", "married", "propty","priors", "school",
"rule", "age", "tservd")
X <- as.matrix(cbind(1, dat[, vars]))
xbar <- apply(X, 2, mean)
z <- dnorm(sum(xbar * b))
pro.me <- rep(0, k-1)
for(i in 1:(k-1)) {
pro.me[i] <- z * b[i+1]
}
print(round(pro.me, 5))
# Logit Marginal effects:
k<-length(coef(fit.log))
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.log))
w <- dlogis(sum(xbar * b))
log.me <- rep(0, k-1)
for(i in 1:(k-1)) {
log.me[i] <- w * b[i+1]
}
print(round(log.me, 5))
##Our probit model is the best fitting
### D - LR Test Statistic
restricted.probit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=dat)
restricted.logit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial, data=dat)
LR.pro <- -2*(logLik(restricted.probit) - logLik(fit.pro))
LR.log <- -2*(logLik(restricted.logit) - logLik(fit.log))
LR.pro
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LR.log
## allow our pro model to carry only significant level values
fit.log <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors +
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="logit"), data = dat)
a<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.pro)))
a
percentage<-(a[1]+a[4])/sum(a)
percentage
## Goodness of fit via McFadden's pseudo-R2
fit.log0<-update(fit.log, formula=.~1)
1-as.vector(logLik(fit.log)/logLik(fit.log0))
## compair against 1980 data
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR")
dat<-read.table("NC1980right.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
fulldat<-read.table("NC1980right.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR")
M<-nrow(fulldat)
N<-ncol(fulldat)
olstest<-array(0,dim=c(M,N-4))
library(AER)
fit.lpm<-coef(summary(lm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + junky + super + married +
workrel + propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd, data=dat)))
fit.pro <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel +
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd,
family=binomial(link="probit"), data = dat)
fit.log<- glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel +
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd,
family=binomial(link="logit"), data = dat)
summary(fit.pro)
summary(fit.log)
summary(fit.pro)
summary(fit.log)
logLik(fit.pro)
logLik(fit.log)
results<-cbind(coef(fit.pro), coef(fit.log))
write.csv(results, "poopstain.csv")
## calculate marginal effects
# First for the Probit Model
k <- length(coef(fit.pro))
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.pro))
vars <- c("white", "alchy", "male","junky", "super", "married", "workrel", "propty",
"person", "priors", "school", "rule", "age", "tservd")
X <- as.matrix(cbind(1, dat[, vars]))
xbar <- apply(X, 2, mean)
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z <- dnorm(sum(xbar * b))
pro.me <- rep(0, k-1)
for(i in 1:(k-1)) {
pro.me[i] <- z * b[i+1]
}
print(round(pro.me, 5))
# Logit Marginal effects:
k<-length(coef(fit.log))
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.log))
w <- dlogis(sum(xbar * b))
log.me <- rep(0, k-1)
for(i in 1:(k-1)) {
log.me[i] <- w * b[i+1]
}
print(round(log.me, 5))
##C - Prediction tables
b<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.pro)))
c<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.log)))
b
c
percentageb<-(b[1]+b[4])/sum(b)
percentageb
percentagec<-(c[1]+c[4])/sum(c)
percentagec
recid <- sum(fulldat[ ,17])
nonrecid <- nrow(fulldat)- recid
recid
nonrecid
##Our probit model is the best fitting
### D - LR Test Statistic
restricted.probit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=dat)
restricted.logit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial, data=dat)
LR.pro <- -2*(logLik(restricted.probit) - logLik(fit.pro))
LR.log <- -2*(logLik(restricted.logit) - logLik(fit.log))
LR.pro
LR.log
## allow our pro model to carry only significant level values
fit.log <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors +
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="logit"), data = dat)
## prediction table
a<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.pro)))
a
percentage<-(a[1]+a[4])/sum(a)
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percentage
## Goodness of fit via McFadden's pseudo-R2
fit.log0<-update(fit.log, formula=.~1)
1-as.vector(logLik(fit.log)/logLik(fit.log0))
Code for Determining SE portion of paper
### r code for gdp and crime
setwd("H:\\")
dat<-read.table("gdpandcrime.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
M<-nrow(dat)
N<-ncol(dat)
olstesttotcrim<-array(0,dim=c(M,2))
## refrence for per capita GDP http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
## crime on per capita real GDP in USA 1960-2011

fit<-lm(dat$TotalCrime~dat$change)
summary(fit)
fit<-lm(dat$fralogtotcrim~dat$change)
summary(fit)
### as GDP increases so does crime only significant at the 95% level low rsqrd
#violentcrime<-as.numeric(dat$ViolentCrime)
fit1<-lm(dat$TotalNOMONEY~dat$change)
fit2<-lm(dat$TotalMONEY~dat$change)
summary(fit1)
summary(fit2)
fit1<-lm(dat$fralogtotnomon~dat$change)
fit2<-lm(dat$fralogtotmon~dat$change)
summary(fit1)
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summary(fit2)
fit1<-lm(dat$fralogtotnomon~dat$changechange)
fit2<-lm(dat$fralogtotcrim~dat$changechange)
summary(fit1)
summary(fit2)
##find what increases with dat$change
fit3<-lm(dat$fraclograp~dat$change)
fit4<-lm(dat$fraclogrob~dat$change)
fit5<-lm(dat$fraclogass~dat$change)
fit6<-lm(dat$fraclogpro~dat$change)
fit7<-lm(dat$fraclogbur~dat$change)
fit8<-lm(dat$fraclogthe~dat$change)
fit9<-lm(dat$VEHPER1000~dat$change)
fit10<-lm(dat$murper1000~dat$change)
summary(fit3)
summary(fit4)
summary(fit5)
summary(fit6)
summary(fit7)
summary(fit8)
summary(fit9)
summary(fit10)
dat0<-read.table("India.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
fitcrime<-lm(dat0$totalcrimperperson~dat0$changeingdp)
summary(fitcrime)
fitfraclog<-lm(dat0$fractcpp~dat0$changeingdp)
summary(fitfraclog)
fitmur<-lm(dat0$fracmur~dat0$changeingdp)
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fitbur<-lm(dat0$fraclogbur~dat0$changeingdp)
summary(fitmur)
summary(fitbur)
#http://ncrb.nic.in/CII-2009-NEW/cii-2009/Table%204.1.pdf
#http://ncrb.nic.in/
#http://ncrb.nic.in/CII-2009-NEW/cii-2009/Table%20Contents.htm
dat01<-read.table("gini2.csv",header = T, sep = ",")
fitmur<-lm(dat01$avemurd~dat01$Gini)
summary(fitmur)
fitmur1<-lm(dat01$fracmur~dat01$Gini)
summary(fitmur1)
dat02<-read.table("gini3.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
fitmur<-lm(dat02$fracmur~dat02$Gini + dat02$law)
dat1<-read.table("reui.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
names(dat1)
fiteiu<-lm(dat1$Murder~ dat1$GDP.realchange)
summary(fiteiu)
fiteiu1<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$firstworld + dat1$GDP.realchange)
summary(fiteiu1)
##check geography
fiteiu2<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$GDP.realchange)
unemploymentpercent<-as.numeric(dat1$Recordedunemployment.)
fiteiu3<-lm(dat1$Murder~unemploymentpercent)
summary(fiteiu3)
fiteiu3.0<-lm(dat1$fracmurd~unemploymentpercent)
summary(fiteiu3.0)
dat4<-read.table("reui3.csv", header= T, sep = ",")

67
fit1<lm(dat4$fracmurd~dat4$Recordedunemployment.+dat4$Inequality+dat4$Legal.re
gulatoryrisk.100.high)

fiteiu3.1<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Male.ofpopulation)
summary(fiteiu3.1)
fiteiu4<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.64)
summary(fiteiu4)
fiteiu5<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19)
summary(fiteiu5)
fiteiu6<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24)
summary(fiteiu6)
fiteiu7<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged0.4)
summary(fiteiu7)
fiteiu8<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged5.9)
summary(fiteiu8)
fiteiu9<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14)
summary(fiteiu9)
fiteiu10<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29)
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summary(fiteiu10)
fiteiu11<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34)
summary(fiteiu11)
fiteiu12<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39)
summary(fiteiu12)
fiteiu13<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44)
summary(fiteiu13)
fiteiu13<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged45.49)
summary(fiteiu13)
fiteiu14<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54)
summary(fiteiu14)
fiteiu15<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59)
summary(fiteiu15)
fiteiu16<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64)
summary(fiteiu16)
fiteiu17<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged65.69)
summary(fiteiu17)
fiteiu18<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged70.74)
summary(fiteiu18)
fiteiu19<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79)
summary(fiteiu19)
fiteiu20<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged80.84)
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summary(fiteiu20)
carsper1000<-as.numeric(dat1$Passengercars.stockper1.000pop.)
fiteiu21<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + carsper1000)
summary(fiteiu21)
petrol<-as.numeric(dat1$Petrolconsumption.tonnes.)
fiteiu22<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + petrol)
summary(fiteiu22)
fiteiu23<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$Workingagepopulationgrowth..pa.)
summary(fiteiu23)
Employmentgrowth<-as.numeric(dat1$Employmentgrowth..pa.)
fiteiu24<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + Employmentgrowth + petrol)
summary(fiteiu24)
fiteiu25<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Productivityofcapital.ICOR.)
summary(fiteiu25)
fiteiu26<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation)
summary(fiteiu26)
fiteiu27<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation)
summary(fiteiu27)
fiteiu28<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
dat1$Female.ofpopulation + petrol)
summary(fiteiu28)
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###Look at political and economic stability
dat2<-read.table("reui2.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
fiteiu29<-lm(dat2$Murder~dat2$South.America + dat2$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
dat2$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + dat2$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+
dat2$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ dat2$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. +
dat2$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + dat2$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+
dat2$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + dat2$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high.
+ dat2$Pricecontrols.5.few. + dat2$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. +
dat2$Stateownership.control.5.low. )
summary(fiteiu29)
dat3<-read.table("reui2.csv", header = T, sep = ",")
M<-na.omit(dat3)
petrol<-as.numeric(M$Petrolconsumption.tonnes.)

fiteiu30<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+
M$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ M$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. +
M$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + M$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+
M$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + M$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high. +
M$Pricecontrols.5.few. + M$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. +
M$Stateownership.control.5.low.)
fiteiu31<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 + petrol)
summary(fiteiu30)
fiteiu31<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+
M$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ M$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. +
M$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + M$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+
M$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + M$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high. +
M$Pricecontrols.5.few. + M$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. +
M$Stateownership.control.5.low.)
summary(fiteiu31)
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fiteiu32<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$X.ofHHsearning.US.10.000p.a.+
M$X.ofHHsearning.US.15.000p.a.+ M$Averagewages.monthly.+
M$Medianhouseholdincome.US.. + M$X.ofHHsearning.US.5.000p.a. +
M$X.ofHHsearning.US.3.000p.a.+ M$X.ofHHsearning.US.1.000p.a. +
M$.ofHHsearning.US$1,000p.a.+ M$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+
M$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ M$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. +
M$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + M$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+
M$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + M$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high. +
M$Pricecontrols.5.few. + M$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. +
M$Stateownership.control.5.low.)
summary(fiteiu32)
newdat1<-na.omit(dat1)
petrol<-as.numeric(m$Petrolconsumption.tonnes.)
fitM1<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Inequality)
summary(fitM1)
## determine the inequality =(((100-DB2)-(100-DC2))*1)+(((100-DB2)-(100DD2))*2)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DE2))*3)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DF2))*4)+(((100-DB2)(100-DG2))*5)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DH2)*6)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DI2))*7)+(((100DB2)-(100-DJ2))*8)+(((100-DC2)-(100-DD2))*1)+((DC2-DE2)*2)+((DC2DF2)*3)+((DC2-DG2)*4)+((DC2-DH2)*5)+((DC2-DI2)*5)+((DC2-DJ2)*6)+((DD2DE2)*1)+((DD2-DF2)*2)+((DD2-DG2)*3)+((DD2-DH2)*4)+((DD2-DI2)*5)+((DD2DJ2)*6)+((DE2-DF2)*1)+((DE2-DG2)*2)+((DE2-DH2)*3)+((DE2-DI2)*4)+((DE2DJ2)*5)+((DF2-DG2)*1)+((DF2-DH2)*2)+((DF2-DI2)*3)+((DF2-DJ2)*4)+((DG2DH2)*1)+((DG2-DI2)*2)+((DG2-DJ2)*3)+((DH2-DI2)*1)+((DH2-DJ2)*2)+((DI2DJ2)*1)
Table results for the code
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Male.ofpopulation)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median

3Q

Max
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-20.252 -3.535 -2.322 0.580 39.447
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-25.9787 25.1076 -1.035 0.3017
dat1$Asia
1.7489 9.6172 0.182 0.8558
dat1$North.America
3.7669 9.8133 0.384 0.7014
dat1$South.America 20.5515 9.6711 2.125 0.0345 *
dat1$Europe
2.0332 9.5948 0.212 0.8323
dat1$Africa
6.4962 9.7460 0.667 0.5056
dat1$Oceania
0.1179 9.8024 0.012 0.9904
dat1$Male.ofpopulation 0.5767 0.4591 1.256 0.2101
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.526 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3053, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2881
F-statistic: 17.71 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.64)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.579 -3.211 -2.482 0.941 39.461
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-5.58560 14.96388 -0.373 0.7092
dat1$Asia
0.82984 9.64803 0.086 0.9315
dat1$North.America
2.49888 9.81622 0.255 0.7992
dat1$South.America
19.93390 9.67865 2.060 0.0404 *
dat1$Europe
0.44592 9.60462 0.046 0.9630
dat1$Africa
7.19340 9.76401 0.737 0.4619
dat1$Oceania
0.05579 9.82093 0.006 0.9955
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.64 0.13792 0.18094 0.762 0.4466
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.543 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3029, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2856
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F-statistic: 17.5 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.309 -3.118 -1.891 0.087 40.456
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-5.9721 10.2491 -0.583 0.5606
dat1$Asia
2.5628 9.5615 0.268 0.7889
dat1$North.America
4.6784 9.7525 0.480 0.6318
dat1$South.America
20.6090 9.5999 2.147 0.0327 *
dat1$Europe
4.0281 9.5840 0.420 0.6746
dat1$Africa
6.0844 9.6814 0.628 0.5302
dat1$Oceania
1.7410 9.7594 0.178 0.8585
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 0.9265 0.3978 2.329 0.0206 *
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.462 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3146, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2976
F-statistic: 18.49 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.087 -3.061 -1.731 0.189 39.198
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-9.7923 10.3624 -0.945 0.34548
dat1$Asia
2.0370 9.4919 0.215 0.83023
dat1$North.America
4.7158 9.6826 0.487 0.62661
dat1$South.America
20.1947 9.5387 2.117 0.03512 *
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dat1$Europe
3.9301 9.4891 0.414 0.67907
dat1$Africa
5.3058 9.6316 0.551 0.58216
dat1$Oceania
1.6679 9.6905 0.172 0.86347
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 1.4598 0.4888 2.987 0.00307 **
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.405 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3228, Adjusted R-squared: 0.306
F-statistic: 19.21 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged0.4)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.834 -3.149 -2.344 -0.261 39.633
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
0.4734 9.9697 0.047 0.9622
dat1$Asia
1.8968 9.6430 0.197 0.8442
dat1$North.America
3.5635 9.8272 0.363 0.7172
dat1$South.America
20.0792 9.6734 2.076 0.0388 *
dat1$Europe
2.2577 9.6641 0.234 0.8154
dat1$Africa
6.4385 9.7655 0.659 0.5102
dat1$Oceania
0.5015 9.8202 0.051 0.9593
dat1$ofpopulationaged0.4 0.2727 0.2903 0.939 0.3484
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.538 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3036, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2863
F-statistic: 17.56 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged5.9)
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Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.994 -3.163 -2.368 0.116 39.771
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
0.2836 10.3050 0.028 0.9781
dat1$Asia
2.0796 9.6829 0.215 0.8301
dat1$North.America
3.7623 9.8771 0.381 0.7036
dat1$South.America
20.2675 9.6850 2.093 0.0373 *
dat1$Europe
2.4031 9.7569 0.246 0.8056
dat1$Africa
6.9280 9.7577 0.710 0.4783
dat1$Oceania
0.8511 9.8602 0.086 0.9313
dat1$ofpopulationaged5.9 0.2700 0.3600 0.750 0.4539
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.543 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3028, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2855
F-statistic: 17.5 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
>
> fiteiu9<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14)
> summary(fiteiu9)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.135 -3.149 -2.359 -0.070 39.958
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-0.7974 10.3154 -0.077 0.9384
dat1$Asia
2.1684 9.6573 0.225 0.8225
dat1$North.America
3.9421 9.8536 0.400 0.6894
dat1$South.America
20.3984 9.6784 2.108 0.0359 *
dat1$Europe
2.7255 9.7179 0.280 0.7793
dat1$Africa
6.8896 9.7496 0.707 0.4804
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dat1$Oceania
1.0946 9.8527 0.111 0.9116
dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14 0.3701 0.3644 1.016 0.3106
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.535 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.304, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2867
F-statistic: 17.59 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
> fiteiu10<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29)
> summary(fiteiu10)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.096 -3.729 -1.661 0.532 38.511
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-10.3568 10.8010 -0.959 0.3384
dat1$Asia
1.7740 9.5272 0.186 0.8524
dat1$North.America
4.6599 9.7250 0.479 0.6322
dat1$South.America
20.1735 9.5757 2.107 0.0360 *
dat1$Europe
2.8746 9.5026 0.303 0.7625
dat1$Africa
6.4634 9.6553 0.669 0.5038
dat1$Oceania
1.7963 9.7353 0.185 0.8537
dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29 1.6139 0.6245 2.584 0.0103 *
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.442 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3176, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3007
F-statistic: 18.75 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
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> fiteiu11<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34)
> summary(fiteiu11)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.173 -3.642 -2.315 0.635 38.060
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-8.3072 11.2456 -0.739 0.4607
dat1$Asia
1.2473 9.5760 0.130 0.8965
dat1$North.America
4.0158 9.7703 0.411 0.6814
dat1$South.America
20.4731 9.6294 2.126 0.0344 *
dat1$Europe
1.7119 9.5324 0.180 0.8576
dat1$Africa
7.7988 9.7159 0.803 0.4228
dat1$Oceania
1.1334 9.7795 0.116 0.9078
dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34 1.4566 0.7634 1.908 0.0574 .
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.492 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3103, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2932
F-statistic: 18.13 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
> fiteiu12<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39)
> summary(fiteiu12)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median

3Q

Max
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-19.722 -3.411 -2.333 1.223 39.306
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
1.4838 10.6580 0.139 0.8894
dat1$Asia
1.1889 9.6409 0.123 0.9019
dat1$North.America
2.8707 9.8122 0.293 0.7701
dat1$South.America
20.0222 9.6861 2.067 0.0396 *
dat1$Europe
0.9281 9.5866 0.097 0.9229
dat1$Africa
7.1269 9.7820 0.729 0.4669
dat1$Oceania
0.1923 9.8274 0.020 0.9844
dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39 0.2417 0.6663 0.363 0.7171
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.55 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3018, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2844
F-statistic: 17.41 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
> fiteiu13<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44)
> summary(fiteiu13)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.576 -3.536 -2.361 1.159 39.421
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
0.69077 10.20555 0.068 0.9461
dat1$Asia
0.96024 9.64232 0.100 0.9207
dat1$North.America
2.44172 9.82515 0.249 0.8039
dat1$South.America
19.91613 9.68072 2.057 0.0406 *
dat1$Europe
0.55247 9.60038 0.058 0.9542
dat1$Africa
7.27139 9.77228 0.744 0.4574
dat1$Oceania
-0.02238 9.82566 -0.002 0.9982
dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44 0.40471 0.58277 0.694 0.4880
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--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.545 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3026, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2853
F-statistic: 17.48 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged45.49)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.644 -3.246 -2.369 1.251 39.544
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
2.69342 10.01129 0.269 0.7881
dat1$Asia
1.18351 9.66483 0.122 0.9026
dat1$North.America
2.68567 9.87220 0.272 0.7858
dat1$South.America
19.95404 9.69201 2.059 0.0404 *
dat1$Europe
0.80736 9.65653 0.084 0.9334
dat1$Africa
6.97778 9.77325 0.714 0.4758
dat1$Oceania
0.07309 9.85037 0.007 0.9941
dat1$ofpopulationaged45.49 0.09933 0.58763 0.169 0.8659
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.552 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3015, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2842
F-statistic: 17.39 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
> fiteiu14<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54)
> summary(fiteiu14)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54)

80
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.359 -3.305 -1.992 0.121 38.820
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
7.3495 9.7879 0.751 0.4534
dat1$Asia
2.4874 9.6083 0.259 0.7959
dat1$North.America
4.6615 9.8138 0.475 0.6352
dat1$South.America
20.4630 9.6388 2.123 0.0346 *
dat1$Europe
3.4588 9.6353 0.359 0.7199
dat1$Africa
6.4062 9.7184 0.659 0.5103
dat1$Oceania
1.4086 9.8007 0.144 0.8858
dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54 -0.9880 0.5606 -1.762 0.0791 .
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.501 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.309, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2919
F-statistic: 18.02 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
> fiteiu15<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59)
> summary(fiteiu15)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.529 -3.222 -1.914 0.724 38.974
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
8.0861 9.5157 0.850 0.39618
dat1$Asia
2.8829 9.4853 0.304 0.76140
dat1$North.America
5.5482 9.6833 0.573 0.56712
dat1$South.America
20.6332 9.5239 2.166 0.03111 *
dat1$Europe
5.0796 9.5101 0.534 0.59367
dat1$Africa
6.4000 9.6010 0.667 0.50558
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dat1$Oceania
2.3336 9.6849 0.241 0.80977
dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59 -1.4806 0.4696 -3.153 0.00179 **
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.389 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3252, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3085
F-statistic: 19.42 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
> fiteiu16<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64)
> summary(fiteiu16)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.365 -3.319 -1.813 0.708 38.776
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
7.8518 9.4746 0.829 0.4080
dat1$Asia
2.7513 9.4640 0.291 0.7715
dat1$North.America
5.3814 9.6572 0.557 0.5778
dat1$South.America
20.5856 9.5053 2.166 0.0312 *
dat1$Europe
5.3020 9.4924 0.559 0.5769
dat1$Africa
6.2676 9.5834 0.654 0.5136
dat1$Oceania
2.2346 9.6622 0.231 0.8173
dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64 -1.7892 0.5381 -3.325 0.0010 **
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.371 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3278, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3111
F-statistic: 19.64 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
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dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged65.69)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.948 -3.456 -2.182 -0.033 39.935
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
5.617 9.590 0.586 0.5585
dat1$Asia
2.351 9.599 0.245 0.8067
dat1$North.America
4.056 9.779 0.415 0.6786
dat1$South.America
20.233 9.633 2.100 0.0366 *
dat1$Europe
3.788 9.653 0.392 0.6950
dat1$Africa
6.479 9.714 0.667 0.5053
dat1$Oceania
1.144 9.787 0.117 0.9070
dat1$ofpopulationaged65.69 -1.151 0.633 -1.818 0.0701 .
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.497 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3095, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2924
F-statistic: 18.06 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged70.74)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.974 -3.407 -2.067 0.208 40.374
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
4.7721 9.5722 0.499 0.6185
dat1$Asia
2.1531 9.6159 0.224 0.8230
dat1$North.America
4.0428 9.8068 0.412 0.6805
dat1$South.America
20.2694 9.6514 2.100 0.0366 *
dat1$Europe
3.4802 9.6898 0.359 0.7197
dat1$Africa
6.6514 9.7302 0.684 0.4948
dat1$Oceania
1.0146 9.8063 0.103 0.9177
dat1$ofpopulationaged70.74 -1.0480 0.6982 -1.501 0.1345
---
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Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.515 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.307, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2898
F-statistic: 17.84 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
>
> fiteiu19<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79)
> summary(fiteiu19)
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.078 -3.252 -2.244 0.399 40.053
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
4.2350 9.5543 0.443 0.6579
dat1$Asia
1.9651 9.6200 0.204 0.8383
dat1$North.America
4.0511 9.8239 0.412 0.6804
dat1$South.America
20.2749 9.6599 2.099 0.0367 *
dat1$Europe
3.2416 9.7026 0.334 0.7386
dat1$Africa
6.6688 9.7385 0.685 0.4940
dat1$Oceania
1.1077 9.8233 0.113 0.9103
dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79 -1.0350 0.7762 -1.333 0.1835
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.523 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3058, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2886
F-statistic: 17.75 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged80.84)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median

3Q

Max
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-20.036 -3.191 -2.091 0.395 40.233
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
4.1117 9.4888 0.433 0.6651
dat1$Asia
1.9421 9.5679 0.203 0.8393
dat1$North.America
4.7103 9.7781 0.482 0.6304
dat1$South.America
20.3363 9.6146 2.115 0.0353 *
dat1$Europe
3.9139 9.6128 0.407 0.6842
dat1$Africa
6.6695 9.6926 0.688 0.4920
dat1$Oceania
1.7161 9.7810 0.175 0.8608
dat1$ofpopulationaged80.84 -1.8234 0.8683 -2.100 0.0366 *
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.479 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3122, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2951
F-statistic: 18.28 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + carsper1000)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-18.372 -3.014 -2.020 0.230 40.005
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
3.380504 9.066117 0.373 0.7095
dat1$Asia
1.994119 9.152421 0.218 0.8277
dat1$North.America 5.598334 9.409099 0.595 0.5523
dat1$South.America 18.673142 9.213566 2.027 0.0437 *
dat1$Europe
3.604861 9.185686 0.392 0.6950
dat1$Africa
9.266695 9.314840 0.995 0.3207
dat1$Oceania
2.857173 9.419474 0.303 0.7619
carsper1000
-0.007521 0.003672 -2.048 0.0415 *
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.066 on 273 degrees of freedom
(9 observations deleted due to missingness)
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Multiple R-squared: 0.285, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2666
F-statistic: 15.54 on 7 and 273 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + petrol)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-23.787 -4.408 -1.191 0.810 37.136
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-3.981141 9.500003 -0.419 0.675486
dat1$Asia
3.983400 9.422022 0.423 0.672781
dat1$North.America 5.697233 9.596992 0.594 0.553224
dat1$South.America 24.007882 9.503078 2.526 0.012074 *
dat1$Europe
5.097505 9.407130 0.542 0.588331
dat1$Africa
9.604581 9.548400 1.006 0.315334
dat1$Oceania
5.126779 9.669803 0.530 0.596401
petrol
0.035906 0.009371 3.832 0.000157 ***
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.313 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.336, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3195
F-statistic: 20.39 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania +
dat1$Workingagepopulationgrowth..pa.)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.233 -3.472 -2.184 -0.172 38.155
Coefficients:
(Intercept)

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
0.5139 9.6457 0.053 0.9575
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dat1$Asia
2.2992 9.6104 0.239 0.8111
dat1$North.America
3.9045 9.7878 0.399 0.6903
dat1$South.America
20.5331 9.6472 2.128 0.0342 *
dat1$Europe
3.1145 9.6262 0.324 0.7465
dat1$Africa
6.6740 9.7218 0.686 0.4930
dat1$Oceania
0.6779 9.7872 0.069 0.9448
dat1$Workingagepopulationgrowth..pa. 1.2210 0.7408 1.648 0.1004
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.507 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3081, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2909
F-statistic: 17.94 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + Employmentgrowth +
petrol)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-24.364 -4.631 -1.071 1.006 37.131
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
-4.481259 9.538924 -0.470 0.6389
dat1$Asia
4.078424 9.397365 0.434 0.6646
dat1$North.America 5.777838 9.581650 0.603 0.5470
dat1$South.America 24.371347 9.452654 2.578 0.0105 *
dat1$Europe
5.319540 9.399749 0.566 0.5719
dat1$Africa
13.837099 9.581905 1.444 0.1499
dat1$Oceania
5.547524 9.630788 0.576 0.5651
Employmentgrowth -0.083719 0.298351 -0.281 0.7792
petrol
0.040374 0.009408 4.291 2.46e-05 ***
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.252 on 275 degrees of freedom
(6 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.3577, Adjusted R-squared: 0.339
F-statistic: 19.14 on 8 and 275 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Productivityofcapital.ICOR.)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-19.697 -3.509 -2.390 1.282 39.424
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
4.12125 9.58402 0.430 0.6675
dat1$Asia
1.07178 9.62464 0.111 0.9114
dat1$North.America
2.37967 9.81100 0.243 0.8085
dat1$South.America
19.63121 9.67968 2.028 0.0435 *
dat1$Europe
0.59819 9.57972 0.062 0.9503
dat1$Africa
7.67093 9.78200 0.784 0.4336
dat1$Oceania
-0.09693 9.81752 -0.010 0.9921
dat1$Productivityofcapital.ICOR. -0.03144 0.03243 -0.970 0.3331
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.537 on 282 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3037, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2865
F-statistic: 17.58 on 7 and 282 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America +
dat1$South.America +
dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.642 -3.766 -1.644 0.157 39.292
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
23.3797 25.6366 0.912 0.3626
dat1$Asia
1.9392 9.5117 0.204 0.8386
dat1$North.America
5.3019 9.7080 0.546 0.5854
dat1$South.America
20.4479 9.5490 2.141 0.0331 *
dat1$Europe
4.2732 9.5432 0.448 0.6547
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dat1$Africa
4.6245 9.6384 0.480 0.6317
dat1$Oceania
1.1471 9.6998 0.118 0.9059
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 2.2350 1.0166 2.199 0.0287 *
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 -0.7344 0.8322 -0.883 0.3783
dat1$Female.ofpopulation -0.6640 0.4713 -1.409 0.1600
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.401 on 280 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3282, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3066
F-statistic: 15.2 on 9 and 280 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-20.442 -3.683 -1.795 -0.161 39.168
Coefficients:

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
19.1690 22.6583 0.846 0.398
dat1$South.America
16.9701 1.7654 9.613 <2e-16 ***
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 2.0687 0.9924 2.085 0.038 *
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 -0.6894 0.8141 -0.847 0.398
dat1$Female.ofpopulation -0.4906 0.4300 -1.141 0.255
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.389 on 285 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.318, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3085
F-statistic: 33.23 on 4 and 285 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Call:
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +
dat1$Female.ofpopulation + petrol)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-24.073 -3.757 -1.370 1.290 37.767
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
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(Intercept)
9.399164 21.147676 0.444 0.657052
dat1$South.America
17.325886 1.717387 10.089 < 2e-16 ***
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 1.131191 0.396684 2.852 0.004668 **
dat1$Female.ofpopulation -0.324025 0.394505 -0.821 0.412137
petrol
0.032490 0.008805 3.690 0.000268 ***
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 9.184 on 285 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3475, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3383
F-statistic: 37.94 on 4 and 285 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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“Many writers claim that nearly all crime is caused by economic conditions, or in other words that
poverty is practically the whole cause of crime. Endless statistics have been gathered on this
subject which seem to show conclusively that property crimes are largely the result of the unequal
distribution of wealth. But crime of any class cannot be safely ascribed to a single cause. Life is
too complex, heredity is too variant and imperfect, too many separate things contribute to human
behavior, to make it possible to trace all actions to a single cause.
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